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POSTSCRIPT TO HOBBY LOBBY:  
PRESCRIPTION FOR ACCOMMODATION OR OVERDOSE? 
Paula Walter 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The debate in Congress, preceding the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA),1 unfurled an inquiry into the nature of healthcare in the United States and the 
role of the government in its delivery.  The ACA was enacted into law in 2010 without 
Republican congressional support.2 Multiple congressional attempts to repeal the ACA have 
failed3 and, instead, a proliferation of lawsuits sought to accomplish through the judiciary what 
the failed legislative efforts could not.  
The first United States Supreme Court decision in 2012 in National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius4 was dispositive in its ruling that the ACA was constitutional 
and within the taxing power of the federal government.5 The individual mandate, the linchpin of 
the ACA, which requires every adult to purchase health insurance, was validated.6 Failure to 
                                                
1 See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified as Amended 42 U.S.C. § 18001). 
2 S. Murray and & L. Montgomery, House Passes Health Care Reform Bill Without Republican Votes, 
WASHINGTON POST, (March 22, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/03/21/AR2010032100943.html.  
3 Nearly five years after its enactment, NPR reported that the Republican controlled House of Representatives was 
still fighting to repeal the ACA, and, had voted 239- 186, to “scrap” the law.  Juana Summers, House Votes To 
Repeal ACA, Though Bill Unlikely To Pass Senate, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (NPR) (published Feb. 3, 2015, 11:02 
AM) (updated Feb. 4, 2015, 4:06 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/02/03/383578256/house-votes-to-repeal-aca-
though-bill-unlikely-to-pass-senate. In the immediate past two years, prior to the February 2015 vote, the Associated 
Press reported that there had been more than 50 separate efforts to repeal the law in the House. Stephen Ohlemacher, 
House Republicans advance bill to undo health law, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (AP) (published Sep. 29, 2015, 1:15 
PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/af844907d2d242ca9d959ae415fa7567/house-gop-advances-filibuster-proof-bill-
undo-health-law.   
4 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600-01 (2012). 
5 Id.  Chief Justice John Roberts, in his majority opinion, held that the individual mandate requiring individuals to 
purchase health insurance was constitutional under the Taxing Clause of the United States Constitution. 
6 Id. Chief Justice Roberts also held, however, that the individual mandate provision exceeded Congress’ power 
under the Commerce Clause. 
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obtain the required insurance results in a penalty payable upon the filing of that individual’s 
taxes with the IRS.7   
 In June 2014, the United States Supreme Court, had its second consideration of litigation 
regarding provisions of the controversial ACA legislation in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp.  In that decision, the Court held that a for-profit 
corporation can assert a claim of free exercise of religion and request an accommodation from 
compliance with the contraceptive mandate.8 This article contends that, consequent to the 
Court’s ruling in Hobby Lobby, the efforts of the challengers to use the judiciary to derail the 
legislatively enacted contraceptive mandate provisions of the ACA have been successful, and 
suggests alternatives for dealing with the flood of anticipated accommodation claims. 
II. HISTORY: ACA & CONTRACEPTIVE MANDATE PROVISION 
The second area of litigation focused on the legislation’s proscription known as the 
contraceptive mandate, which required all employers with fifty employees to provide insurance 
coverage for “minimum essential services.”9 The contraceptive mandate is subsumed within the 
definition of an essential service. The ACA represents the first time that federal rules mandated 
insurance coverage of contraceptives as part of preventive care, at no cost, to female employees. 
This controversial regulation was not included in the original draft of the legislation.  The 
Women’s Health Amendment was introduced by Senator Barbara Mikulski in December 2009 
and passed as the first amendment during the health reform legislation process.10 The Secretary 
                                                
7 26 C.F.R. § 1.5000A-4  (2014). 
8 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768-69 (2014). 
9 45 C.F.R. § 156.604 (2014). 
10 Senator Barbara Mikulski, Democrat from Maryland, introduced a bill to fill a gap in the ACA by making the 
Women’s Preventive Health Service a part of every health plan basic benefits package. On December 3, 2009, 
breaking a three-day stalemate, the Senate passed, by a vote of 61-39, the Women’s Health Initiative.  S. 
Amdt. 2791, 111th Congress (2009-2010); See also Press Release, Senator Barbara Mikulski, Senate Approves 
Mikulski Amendment Making Women’s Preventive Care Affordable and Accessible (Dec. 3, 2009), 
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of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) requested that a panel of experts 
convened by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) “review the science and make recommendations 
for what women’s preventive health services should be covered.”11 
 In July 2011, the IOM published its final report, which recommended that, “the full 
range of Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods and sterilization 
procedures and patient education and counseling for women with reproductive capacity” be 
adopted.12  Among the twenty contraceptives, as defined by the Institute of Medicine, are four 
methods which some have categorized as abortifacients. These regulations were adopted in 
August 2011.13 
 In January 2012, the HHS announced the adoption of the religious employer exemption.  
The exemption from compliance with the contraceptive mandate was originally limited to 
religious employers or employers defined as houses of worship.14 This waiver did not apply to 
religiously affiliated entities, such as universities, hospitals, or schools.  The final rule in 
February 2013 accommodated the objections of the non-profit faith based charitable 
organizations not originally included in the narrow definition of “houses of worship.” 15The 
accommodation available through this waiver exempts the religious employer and the religiously 
                                                                                                                                                       
http://www.mikulski.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/senate-approves-mikulski-amendment-making-women-
and-39s-preventive-care-affordable-and-accessible. 
11Press Release, Senator Barbara Mikulski, Mikulski Applauds Adoption of IOM Guidelines for Women’s 
Preventive Health (August 1, 2011,) https://www.mikulski.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/mikulski-applauds-
adoption-of-iom-guidlines-for-women-and-39s-preventive-health.  
12 Committee on Preventive Services for Women, Clinical Preventive Services for Women: Closing the Gaps, 
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE (IOM) at 109-10 (2011) available at http://www.nap.edu/read/13181/chapter/7#109.  
13 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762 (2014); See also Women’s Preventive Services 
Guidelines, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMINISTRATION: U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 
http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines. 
14  (1) The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the organization 
     (2) The organization primarily employs persons who share the religious tenets of the organization 
     (3) The organization serves primarily persons who share the religious tenets of the organization 
     (4) The organization is a non-profit organization as described in section 6033(a) and section     
           6033(a)(3)(A)(i0 or (ii) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended  
45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B) (2013)(overruled in 2015, new statute 45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (2015)).  
15 Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 8456-01 (Feb. 6, 2013). 
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affiliated employer from paying directly for the insurance coverage of contraceptives. The 
female employee does, however, retain her right to insurance coverage for contraceptives at no 
cost. This is accomplished when the employer notifies the insurer of his election to exercise the 
waiver.16 The insurance company then issues a separate policy, directly to the female employee, 
to cover contraceptives at no cost to her.  In effect, the cost of coverage for contraceptive 
insurance is transferred from the employer to the insurer. 
Faith-based, for-profit entities were still not included in the final rule and did not qualify 
for an accommodation.   The ACA provides for an assessment of a penalty on the employer 
should he choose not to comply with the contraceptive mandate and if, as a result of such non-
compliance, one employee avails herself of the government subsidy to purchase health 
insurance.17  The outcry that followed this final rule led to a multiplicity of lawsuits filed by 
                                                
16 Religious non-profits are permitted to opt out of providing insurance coverage for contraception by completing an 
opt-out form.  At that point a third party, the insurance company takes over the provision of coverage. Should the 
opt-out form be filed with the federal Department Human Health Services, the government then notifies the 
insurance administrator.  In the most recent federal appeals court decision, Catholic Health Care Sys. v. Burwell, 
796 F.3d 207, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 13813 (2d. Cir. N.Y. 2015), the court ruled that the filing of the opt-out form, 
in and of itself, does not constitute a substantial burden.  The Catholic Health Care System had challenged the filing 
of the waiver form and argued that the filing, in and of itself, was a substantial burden on the exercise of religion. 
The court held that, “there is no substantial burden here. The regulatory obligations imposed on third parties after 
Plaintiffs opt out do not transform the de minimus act of notification into a substantial burden.” Id. at 222. The 
burden that the accommodation places on plaintiffs is merely one of notification. 
17 Large employer not offering health coverage. If: 
(1) any applicable large employer fails to offer its full-time employees (and their dependents) the opportunity to 
enroll in minimum essential coverage under an eligible employer-sponsored plan (as defined in section 
5000(A)(f)(2)) for any month, and 
(2) at least one full-time employee of the applicable large employer has been certified to the employer under 
section 1411 of the PPACA as having enrolled for such month in a  qualified health plan with respect to 
which an application premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction is allowed or paid with respect to the 
employee,  
  then there is hereby imposed on the employer an assessable payment equal to the product  
 of the applicable payment amount and the number of the individuals employed by the   
 employer as full-time employees during such month. 
26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a) (2011).  
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faith-based for-profit employers, typically, family-run, closely-held corporations operated 
according to Christian principles.18 
These plaintiffs argued that the government was overreaching in its legislative regulation 
and that compliance with the contraceptive mandate constituted a substantial burden on their 
freedom to exercise religion.  The faith-based employer argued that his sincerely held religious 
belief, which defines life’s beginning at conception, precluded the endorsement of certain 
contraceptive procedures required by the ACA, specifically the four contraceptive measures that 
act as abortifacients.19 The argument posits that the choice between compliance and assessment 
of a significant penalty constitutes a substantial burden on the exercise of religious freedom.  In 
the facts of the Hobby Lobby case, the penalty would have amounted to a sum of $475 million 
annually and $3.3 million for the Conestoga Wood plaintiffs, based on a $2000 per employee 
fine imposed by the statute.20  The owners of the Hobby Lobby craft stores, the Green Family, 
initiated its lawsuit challenging the contraceptive mandate.  At the time, the family owned more 
than five hundred stores with over 25,000 employees across forty- five states and with annual 
sales estimated at over two billion dollars.21   In 2013, Mr. Green was listed as the 79th 
wealthiest person in the United States with a net worth of $4.5 billion.22 The Hobby Lobby 
stores, operating in accordance with Christian beliefs, were committed to the company mission 
statement, which believed in “honoring the Lord in all we do by operating the company in a 
                                                
18 See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (2012) rev'd and remanded, 723 F.3d 1114 
(2013) aff'd sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 189 L. Ed. 2d 675 (2014); Grote v. 
Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 853 (2013); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 724 F.3d 377 cert. granted, 134 
S. Ct. 678 , 187 L. Ed. 2d 544 (2013); Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618 (2013).   
19 See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (2012). Included in its enumeration of covered contraceptive 
medicines is Ella, an emergency contraceptive that acts like an abortion drug and RU-486, also known as the 
morning after pill. 
20  45 C.F.R. § 156.604 
21 Our Story, hobby lobby, http://www.hobbylobby.com/about-us/our-story (Oct. 28, 2015 at 2:30PM) Mr. David 
Green started his craft business in 1970 with a $600 loan, which he grew into a successful crafts store.  
22 The World’s Billionaires: #228 David Green, FORBES 400, http://www.forbes.com/profile/david-green (Oct. 28, 
2015 at 1:00PM). 
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manner consistent with Biblical principles.”23  Additionally, every family member in the business 
also signed a commitment statement in which he agreed to “use the Green family assets to create, 
support and leverage the efforts of the Christian mission.”24  Like the Green family, Mr. and Mrs. 
Hahn and their three sons, the plaintiffs in Conestoga Woods, employed nine hundred and fifty 
employees in their wood cabinetry manufacturing business, which was operated in accordance 
with their Mennonite Christian principles.25  Neither plaintiff operated his business as a mom and 
pop operation. Especially contentious for the challengers, also, was the allegation that the for-
profit versus not-for-profit status is an arbitrary distinction and not well supported by the case 
law on religious accommodation claims. 
The ACA is predicated on a balancing of the respective interests of employers and 
employees in the workplace. To what extent should an individual’s sincere religious beliefs be 
accommodated when that very accommodation will negatively impact others in what should be a 
neutral work space? To what extent can the employer’s sincerely held religious convictions be 
imposed on his employee’s legislatively granted rights and benefits? A circuit split developed at 
the appellate level.26  In Conestoga Wood,27 the Third Circuit held that the contraceptive mandate 
                                                
23 Our Story, HOBBY LOBBY, http://www.hobbylobby.com/about-us/our-story (Oct. 28, 2015 at 2:30PM).  
24 See generally, DAVID GREEN, MORE THAN A HOBBY: HOW A $600 START-UP BECAME AMERICAN’S HOME AND 
CRAFT SUPERSTORE (2005). Consistent with their beliefs, the Greens had in the past refused to rent space to a liquor 
store because their religious beliefs prohibited the promotion of alcohol use. 
25 Conestoga’s mission statement includes the following language: “we operate in a professional environment 
founded upon the highest ethical, moral and Christian principles reflecting respect, support and trust, for our 
suppliers, our employees and their families.” First Amended Verified Complaint at ¶ 33, Conestoga Wood 
Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U. S. Dep’t of HHS, 724 F. 3d 377 (January 11, 2013), available at 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-PA-0007-0008.pdf.  The Conestoga Board of Directors adopted, 
“The Hahn Family Statement on the Sanctity of Human Life,” which states that, “[t]he Hahn family has always 
believed that the Bible is the inspired, infallible, and authoritative word of God, the one and only eternal God . . . the 
Hahn family believes that human life begins at conception (at the point where an egg and sperm unite) and that it is 
a sacred gift from God and only God has the right to terminate human life. Therefore, it is against our moral 
conviction to be involved in the termination of human life through abortion, suicide, euthanasia, murder, or any 
other acts that involve the deliberate taking of human life.” Id. at ¶ 92.  
26 Both the seventh and tenth circuits held that secular, for-profit corporations could assert free exercise claims. 
Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F. 3d 850 (2013) and Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F. 3d 1114, 1133 (2013). On 
the other hand, the third circuit in Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of HHS, 724 F. 3d 
377 (2013), found that a for-profit corporation could not mount a claim of free exercise.  
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was enforceable against the for-profit, closely held corporate employer, whereas the Tenth 
Circuit in Hobby Lobby28 found in favor of the plaintiffs and held that the contraceptive mandate 
violated the religious freedom of the for-profit closely held corporation. 
III.   HOBBY LOBBY, CONESTOGA WOOD, AND THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT 
 
The United States Supreme Court decision in the consolidated cases of Conestoga Wood 
and Hobby Lobby29 appeared to settle the issue in its ruling that the sincere religious beliefs of an 
employer, who conducts his business in the form of a closely held corporation, must be 
accommodated because of The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).30 Justice Alito 
further held that the interests of the employees of the for-profit corporation can be protected 
through the mechanism of shifting the insurance consequences from the employer to the 
insurance company itself, similar to the case of the religiously affiliated non-profit employer.31  
The highest court made reference to the application of both the constitutional protections 
of the free exercise of religion and the statutory protection under the RFRA.  However, the Court 
refrained from finding for the plaintiffs on constitutional free exercise grounds but instead ruled 
                                                                                                                                                       
27 Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 417. 
28 Hobby Lobby, 723 F. 3d at 1146-47 
29 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014).  
30 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993) 
31 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).  Initially, it seems that Judge Alito was more 
comfortable with the federal government directly assuming the payment for the insurance coverage of 
contraceptives when he states that, “[t]he most straightforward way of doing this would be for the Government to 
assume the cost of providing the four contraceptives at issue.” Id. at 2780.  
He then backtracks from endorsing a government funded option and states instead, “[i]n the end, however, we need 
not rely on the option of a new, government-funded program in order to conclude that HHS regulations fail the least 
restrictive test . . . HHS has already established an accommodation for non-profit organizations with religious 
objections.  Under that accommodation, the organization can self-certify that it opposes providing coverage for 
particular contraceptive service.  If the organization makes such certification, the organization’s insurance issues or 
third party administrator must ‘[e]xpressly exclude contraceptive coverage from the group health insurance coverage 
provided in connection with the group health plan’ and “[p]rovide separate payment for any contraceptive services 
required to be covered’ without imposing ‘any cost-sharing requirements . . . on the eligible organization, the group 
health plan, or plan participants or beneficiaries.’” Id. at 2781-82 (citations omitted). 
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solely on the basis of the RFRA legislation.32   Legal protection of one’s right to exercise his 
religion without undue influence from government regulation is derived from two independent 
sources, (1) US Constitution and (2) statute. The First Amendment stipulates two separate 
guarantees for religious freedom, the Establishment Clause,33 which prohibits the government 
from creating a state religion, and the Free Exercise Clause,34 which allows an individual to 
worship as he wishes.  Prior to the granting of statutory protection for religious worship through 
RFRA, the Free Exercise Clause prohibited the government from infringing on a citizen’s free 
exercise rights. 
IV.   THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT 
 The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) was passed by Congress in 1993 as a 
legislative response to the United States Supreme Court ruling in Employment Division of Dept. 
of Resources of Oregon v. Smith.35 There, the Court held that free exercise claims need not be 
accommodated when the law, which impacts a person’s religious belief was deemed neutral and 
was applied uniformly.  The facts in the case related to drug rehabilitation counselors who were 
denied unemployment benefits after being fired for violating a state law that prohibited the use of 
the Hallucinogen drug Peyote. In their defense, they argued that the use of the drug was integral 
to their religious beliefs.  The Supreme Court did not accept the argument that religious beliefs 
excused its practitioners from complying with laws and quoted its earlier precedent in Reynolds 
v. United States to assert that,  
                                                
32 Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. at 2785 (“The contraceptive mandate, as applied to closely held corporations 
violates RFRA. Our decision on that statutory question makes it unnecessary to reach the First Amendment claim 
raised by Conestoga and the Hahns.”). 
33 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit, the free 
exercise thereof.”).   
34 U.S. CONST. amend. I 
35 Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere 
with mere religious beliefs and opinions, they may with practices… Can a man 
excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this 
would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of 
the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.36 
 
For a statute to pass judicial muster, the Smith Court emphasized that the legislation be neutral, 
of general applicability, and not specifically target an individual’s free exercise of religion.37 
Facially neutral laws were not to be invalidated if the interference with free exercise was 
incidental.  The Smith case was said to establish a rational review standard. 
 The Smith test, challenged by groups of many different religious persuasions, resulted in 
Congress passing RFRA, which set the standard for the government to demonstrate that it had a 
compelling interest in enacting legislation that could potentially impact an individual’s freedom 
of exercise.38  However, a substantial burden on that person’s free exercise of religion must be 
accommodated.39  RFRA’s purpose was said to restore the compelling interest, or the strict 
scrutiny standard, that had preceded the Smith decision.  RFRA, although purporting to return to 
the pre-Smith standard of free exercise jurisprudence, in fact, heightened the test to that of a 
strict scrutiny standard. 
In Hobby Lobby, the positive outcome for the for-profit corporate employer, namely, the 
accommodation of its free exercise claim, hinged on a close reading of the language in RFRA 
                                                
36  Id. at 878 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, at 166-167 (1878))  
37  Id. at 882. 
38 In the preamble to the legislation, Congressional findings and declaration of its purpose is found in the following 
statement at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a),  
 (4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the Supreme Court virtually          
eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed         by 
law neutral toward religion; and  
 (5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for           
striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental            interests 
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4)-(5)(2016).  
39 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (“The purposes of this chapter are—(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its 
application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and (2) to provide a claim or 
defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.”). 
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that prohibits the government, despite its compelling interest, from exercising a substantial 
burden on free exercise unless by the least restrictive means.  Justice Alito, writing for the 
majority, assumed that the government has a compelling interest.40 The federal government 
sustained its argument in favor of that compelling interest in two ways.  Its first argument was 
predicated on the assumption that absent mandatory compliance, the government’s interest in 
achieving the goal of comprehensive health insurance coverage would be compromised.  
Secondly, the government’s national interest in public health also addressed the inequality that 
confronts women whose health costs exceed those of their male counterparts because women 
alone bear the costs of contraception and reproduction.  As of this writing, the New York Times 
reported on July 8, 2015, that health care costs for women have been sharply reduced since the 
implementation of the contraceptive mandate.41 The Times article was based on a University of 
Pennsylvania study that analyzed insurance claims of large insurance companies in the fifty 
states.  The significant decline in expenditures for birth control, the study concluded, was 
probably due to the ACA, which was described as “the biggest piece of social legislation in 
decades, on women’s pocketbooks.”42  
In contradistinction to the Supreme Court, there are still those who argue, based on a 
theory of implied consent, that an employee should not be permitted to invoke a free exercise 
claim when he chooses to work for an organization where it is clear from the circumstances that 
the employer seeks to accomplish religious objectives. That employee is then said to give 
                                                
40 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2780. Alito J.’s response to the HHS arguments that the 
contraceptive mandate constitutes a compelling interest as it promotes “public health” and “gender equality.” (“We 
find it unnecessary to adjudicate this issue. We will assume that the interest in guaranteeing cost free access to the 
four challenged contraceptive methods is compelling within the meaning of RFRA . . . .”). 
 
41 Sabrina Tavernise, Women Are Paying Less For Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2015, at A11; see also Sabrina 
Tavernise, After Health Care Act, Sharp Drop in Spending on Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/08/health/after-health-care-act-sharp-drop-in-spending-on-birth-control.html. 
42 Id. The study estimated that savings from the pill alone were about $1.4 billion in calendar year 2013. 
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implied consent to be free from governmental regulation of that workplace relationship.43  In a 
case of mixed secular or commercial and religious objectives, the argument proceeds to assert 
that the partly secular aspect of the employment does not detract from the employee’s implied 
consent because the employee has adequate notice of the importance of the religious objectives 
of his employer.44 Similarly, others have questioned the nexus between the contraception 
mandate and the government’s compelling interest by citing scientific disagreement, which 
questions what is meant by the term “unwanted pregnancy,” and asks further whether the 
governmental contraceptive mandate would in fact lead to its reduction.45  One author suggests 
that unintended pregnancies tend to have the greatest impact on poorer American women, but 
that this class of women makes little use of the free or very low cost contraceptives already 
available to them.46  She further posits that cost turns out not to be a significant factor among 
women who use contraceptives at a higher rate and are willing and able to pay.47 
 Once the majority, in Hobby Lobby, determined that a not-for-profit corporation 
qualified as a person with capacity to assert a free exercise claim, the Court had no difficulty 
applying the two-prong RFRA test to the ACA contraceptive mandate.  Justice Alito turned to 
the Dictionary Act for clarification of the term “person” and found that the Act specifically 
                                                
43 Michael A. Helfand, What is a “Church”?: Implied Consent and the Contraception Mandate, 21 J. CONT. LEGAL 
ISSUES 401, 401-02 (2013).  
44 Id. at 423-25 (“[w]here religion is integrated into the day-to-day operations of an institution . . . employees are 
alerted to the importance of religious objectives to the institution.  Accordingly, when individuals join the institution 
as employees we can safely assume that they understand that the institution is organized to achieve uniquely 
religious objectives . . . .”)(“[E]mployees understand that the company’s objectives are not simply secular or 
commercial.”).  
45 Helen M. Alvaré, John F. Scarpa Conference on Law, Politics and Culture: Living the Catholic Faith in Public 
Life, 58 Vill. L. Rev. 371, 398 (2013). Professor Alvaré points out that no agreement exists as to how to measure an 
“unintended pregnancy” and that the issue becomes even more murky because access to birth control does not 
translate into increased use, “Even if we accepted the IOM Report’s claims regarding how to define unintended 
pregnancy, it is not clear that the Report’s recommendation would lower rates of unintended pregnancy. . . . It can 
give women access to contraceptives but it cannot force them to use it.” 
46 Id. (“For it turns out that there are many and varied reasons why women choose not to use contraception, most of 
which have nothing to do with cost.”).  
47 Id. at 399, 427. 
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included both the human or natural as well as the legal person in its definition.48  Justice Alito 
further found that Congress, in its enactment of the ACA, did not intend to narrow the definition 
to limit “person” to a human person only.  Had Congress intended to do so, argued Justice Alito, 
that intention would have been clarified in the ACA legislation.49 By contrast, Justice Ginsburg, 
writing for the dissent, stated that the Dictionary Act definition of a “person” should control only 
where the context of the legislation’s use of the term does not indicate otherwise.50 Justice 
Ginsburg concluded that precedent does not support the argument that a corporation can exercise 
religion and that only a human person can so choose.51 The majority and the dissent were 
engaged in the classic argument of textual interpretation of a statute versus a purpose analysis of 
the legislation.  The debate over the original meaning versus the context or purpose of the 
legislation has been part of an ongoing legal debate and the justices’ bias and respective views of 
the role of the judiciary is reflected in the Hobby Lobby decision. 
 The corporation, an artificial entity, is a legal person and its principal characteristics 
include the attributes of perpetual existence, limited liability, separate entity status, and 
separation of ownership from control.  The corporation was created to meet a unique economic 
need, namely, that of raising revenue while simultaneously shielding the investors from 
unlimited liability as a result of their monetary stake in a business venture.  The corporation, in 
its capacity as a legal person, has been endowed with certain constitutional rights, whereas other 
                                                
48 Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2768 (“A corporation is simply a form of organization used by human beings to achieve 
desired ends. An established body of law specifies the rights and obligations of the people (including shareholders, 
officers, and employees) who are association with a corporation in one way or another. When rights, whether 
constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these people.”). 
 
49 Id. at 2768-69 (arguing that the term “person” sometimes encompasses artificial persons (as the Dictionary Act 
instructs) and it sometimes is limited to natural persons. But no conceivable definition of the term includes natural 
persons and nonprofit corporations, but not for –profit corporations). 
50 Id. at 2793-94 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Dictionary Act's definition, however, controls only where ‘context’ 
does not ‘indicat[e] otherwise.’ § 1. Here, context does so indicate. RFRA speaks of ‘a person's exercise of 
religion.’”). 
51 Id. at 2794.   
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rights have been reserved for the human person exclusively.52  Recently, the United States 
Supreme Court, in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,53 stated that political free 
speech could not be suppressed only because its speaker is a corporation.54 Since the protection 
of both the rights to freedom of speech and the freedom of religion are found in the First 
Amendment, the Hobby Lobby plaintiffs sought to extend the Citizens United precedent to the 
Free Exercise Clause. Just as the corporation is endowed with free speech rights, so too should 
the corporation be endowed with free exercise rights. Can the Citizens United ruling be expanded 
to include the proposition that a corporation has free exercise rights? Reference was made to the 
earlier First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti55 case, where the Court found that the purpose of 
the Free Exercise clause is to secure religious liberty in the individual because the “historic 
function” of a particular guarantee is limited to the protection of the individual and whether a 
particular guarantee is “purely personal” and “is unavailable to corporations for some other 
reason depends on the nature, history and purpose of the particular constitutional provision.”56 
The opposing litigants each used this language to bolster its distinct argument.  
The plaintiffs argued that just because the Bellotti Court found the Free Exercise Clause 
to be a purely personal right, it did not prevent the Hobby Lobby Court from extending the free 
exercise protection to for-profit corporations because protecting the free exercise rights of 
corporations, like Hobby Lobby and Conestoga, means protecting “the religious liberty of those 
                                                
52 The United States Supreme Court has long held that corporations are “persons” in law. Covington & L. Tpk. Rd. 
Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592 (1896); see also Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 154 (1897); 
United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-99 (1944) The Supreme Court has also found that a corporation cannot 
assert a claim asserting the privilege against self-incrimination as this is a personal privilege applicable to natural 
individuals only. 
53 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010). 
54 Id. at 342-43. The Supreme Court discussed, at length, the history of the corporation’s right to freedom of speech 
before concluding that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA)—a statute which would have placed 
limitations on a corporation’s advertising expenses in endorsing political candidates—unconstitutional.  
55 See generally First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
56 Id. at 778-79 (citing United States v. White, 322 U.S. at 698–701). 
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who own and control those companies.”57 The Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit in Hobby 
Lobby found that there was “no reason the Supreme Court would recognize constitutional 
protection for a corporation’s political expression but not its religious expression.”58  
In this reading of Bellotti, the plaintiffs focused on the nature of the right being protected 
rather than on the party invoking that protection.  In reframing the inquiry in such manner, it 
becomes possible to disregard the question whether First Amendment rights is limited to the 
“human” persons but to instead focus on the nature of the protected activity.  On the other hand, 
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Conestoga Wood Secialties Corp. v. Secretary of 
United States Human Health Services59 relied heavily on the “purely personal” language of 
Bellotti, and found that free exercise rights were limited to the natural person.60  The Supreme 
Court followed its earlier precedent in Citizens United and focused on the right being protected 
rather than on the party invoking the claim to protection and simply sidestepped the issue as to 
whether a corporation, qua corporation, can exercise religion. 
 Next, Justice Alito questioned whether an individual barters his right to invoke a free 
exercise claim when he engages in business.  In the earlier Braunfeld v. Brown case,61 the Court 
did not view the link between the profit motive and religion as problematic.  Mr. Braunfeld, a 
solo practitioner, argued that because the state’s Sunday laws required the closing of his retail 
store on Sundays, he incurred significant business losses. The state’s law impacted his free 
                                                
57 Burwell, S. Ct. at 2768. 
58 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1135.  
59 Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 380-83 (3d Cir. 2013).  
60 Id. The Third Circuit emphasized the Supreme Court’s earlier precedents and history which had never protected 
religious liberty in a corporation unlike the Court’s history which found that among the corporation’s protected 
rights was included the right to free speech.   
(“In analyzing which constitutional guarantees apply to corporations, the Supreme Court has held certain guarantees 
are “purely personal” because the ‘historic function’ of the particular guarantee has been limited to the protection of 
the individual. Whether or not a particular guarantee is “purely personal” or is unavailable to corporations for some 
other reason depends on the nature, history, and purpose of the particular constitutional provision.”).   
61 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 601-09 (1961). 
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exercise rights as an Orthodox Jew, as his religion prohibited conducting commerce on Saturday, 
Mr. Braunfeld’s day of rest.  Even though the Court ruled against Mr. Braunfeld on other 
grounds, it found that the pursuit of profit does not ipso facto mean the forfeiture of free exercise 
claims.62 
 Therefore, should the injection of the corporate form, which allows the separation of the 
business entity from its owner in order to insulate him from personal liability for the 
corporation’s obligations, create a legal impediment to a free exercise claim?  Justice Alito, 
relying on the Braunfeld decision, found that because the law permits a religious individual to 
both pursue an activity for-profit and simultaneously assert a free exercise claim, that precedent 
does not demand that sincerely held religious beliefs be abandoned simply because one’s efforts 
to earn a livelihood collide with the statutory regulation of that business. With the corporate 
interface, the Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby, Conestoga Wood held that the owners of a family 
operated, closely-held, for-profit corporation can assert a free exercise claim precisely because 
they did not trade in that right due to their choice of business association: 
If, as Braunfeld recognized, a sole proprietorship that seeks to make a profit may 
assert a free-exercise claim, why can’t Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel do 
the same? . . . While it is certainly true that a central objective of for-profit 
corporations is to make money, modern corporate law does not require for-profit 
corporations to pursue profit at the expense of everything else, . . . .63 
 
Justice Ginsburg, on the other hand, writing for the dissent, stated that, “[h]ad Congress intended 
RFRA to initiate a change so huge, a clarion statement to that effect likely would have been 
made in the legislation.”64  For the dissent, the legal issue of accommodation could never be 
triggered once the corporate form of doing business is employed.  Justice Ginsburg quoted the 
                                                
62 Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2769-70 (“In Braunfeld . . . we entertained the free-exercise claims of individuals who were 
attempting to make a profit as retail merchants, and the Court never even hinted that this objective precluded their 
claims.”). 
63 Id. at 2770-71. 
64 Id. at 2796 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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earlier United States v. Lee65 decision as binding precedent for the proposition that the corporate 
form of doing business imposes restrictions on behavior, indicating, 
[w]hen followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of 
choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and 
faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on 
others in that activity.66 
 
In the Lee case, an Amish farmer refused to contribute to the mandatory national social 
security system because his Amish religion forbade the receipt of social security benefits, which 
thus barred any contributions to that system.  There, a clash between one’s religious obligation 
and his statutorily imposed civic obligation was resolved by the courts in favor of the state laws, 
which furthered the government’s compelling interest. Justice Ginsburg endorsed the thesis that 
engaging in commercial activity should always trump religious beliefs because the dissent cannot 
tolerate the possibility that one person’s – the employer’s religious faith – be imposed on others 
–  the employee.67 To the dissent, the voluntary nature of a commercial enterprise cedes to the 
statutory regulation of that very enterprise. To illustrate this point, Justice Ginsburg stated, 
“[w]orking for Hobby Lobby or Conestoga . . . should not deprive employees of the preventative 
care available to workers at the shop next door, at least in the absence of directions from the 
Legislature or Administration to do so.”68 
 How should one understand the gulf between the majority and the dissenting opinions?  
Each judicial position in this debate is an attempt to calibrate the role of religion in the 
marketplace. In Hobby Lobby, the majority is not disturbed by the infusion of religion and its 
values into the public sphere, whereas the dissent takes a dimmer view of the consequences when 
                                                
65 U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982). 
66 Id. at 262.  
67 Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Further, the Court recognized in Lee that allowing a 
religion-based exemption to a commercial employer would ‘operat[e] to impose the employer's religious faith on the 
employees.’”). 
68 Id. 
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religious values are conflated with economic ventures.  In her final paragraph, Justice Ginsburg 
stated that, “[t]here is an overriding interest, I believe, in keeping the courts ‘out of the business 
of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims.’”69  She did not view the judiciary 
as the appropriate forum for determining which religious beliefs are worthy of accommodation 
because, “approving some religious claims, while deeming others unworthy of accommodation 
could be ‘perceived as favoring one religion over another’ the very ‘risk the Establishment 
Clause was designed to preclude.’ The Court, I fear, has ventured into a minefield.”70 
 Justice Alito, in his majority opinion, accepted the judiciary as the appropriate forum to 
sort out the relative tensions between statutory regulation and religious accommodation. If a 
burden must be imposed, then only the least restrictive means to do so is permitted.  Justice Alito 
dismissed the argument that opening the door to the closely- held, for-profit corporation’s claim 
of free exercise will beget a floodgate of claims resulting in “divisive, polarizing proxy battles 
over the religious identity of large, publicly traded corporations such as IBM or General 
Electric.”71  In his dismissal of even the likelihood of a dispute of this nature, Justice Alito relied 
on state corporate law, which “provides a ready means for resolving any conflicts,”72 to dictate 
how a corporation establishes its governing structure and to how to manage business disputes. 
There has also been an academic suggestion, by Professor Willis, that a new corporation’s law 
statute be enacted to legally recognize a new entity, that of the faith-based corporation, and that 
this newly created artificial entity be deemed a person for the purposes of RFRA.73  
 
                                                
69 Id. at 2805 (citation omitted).   
70 Id. (citation omitted).  
 
71 Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2774 (citation omitted).  
72 Id. at 2775. 
73 Steven J. Willis, Corporations, Taxes and Religion: The Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Contraception Cases, 65 
S.C. L. REV. 1, 58-61 (2013).  
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V. REFINING THE DEBATE 
How could the Court shoehorn the for-profit closely held corporation within the 
definition of a person with free exercise entitlement rights? The United States Supreme Court has 
taken a giant leap in its recognition of religious exercise claims for the for-profit corporation.  
Despite the Court’s insistence that the case law restricts recognition of free exercise rights to the 
closely held, family run, for-profit corporations, the door has been opened, significantly, to 
future corporate demands for accommodation.   
 Scholars, who have examined more recent developments in constitutional law and 
especially the relationship between social and legal changes, posit the reasonable view that the 
contraceptive mandate controversy reflects a weakening of our social consensus on cultural 
issues.74  In fact, one commentator goes so far as to suggest that the controversy surrounding 
Hobby Lobby would probably not have occurred thirty years ago “given the state of social 
consensus at the time.”75 He posits that this clash reflects a deeper culture war as seen through 
the shift in perspective on the status of same sex marriage and gay rights.76 Those of a more 
liberal Weltanschauung who advocated for same sex marriage were also in the forefront in the 
defense of the contraceptive mandate.77 As of this writing, the United States Supreme Court, in 
Obergefell v. Hodges, held that there is a constitutional right to same sex marriage.78 This ruling 
was handed down approximately one year after the Court’s decision in the contraceptive 
mandate cases. 
                                                
74 Ronald J. Colombo, The Naked Private Square, 51, HOUS. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (2013).  
75 Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 158 (2014). 
76 Id. at 159-60. 
77 Id. at 176-77 (“[T]he the debate over same-sex marriage and religious liberty is responsible neither for the 
contraception mandate nor for the litigation it produced. But the debate has a great deal to do with just how large 
Hobby Lobby loomed in the public conversation — and still does. . . . That Hobby Lobby was, so to speak, in some 
measure a gay rights case, and that any case that intersects with the culture wars is likely to receive an added amount 
of attention and controversy, . . .”). 
78 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015). 
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 What is being debated is the nature of religion and its place in society.  If religion is seen 
as merely one of many traits an individual possesses, that single personal characteristic retains its 
unique position and can be separated from other variables, which compose the entirety of that 
individual’s persona.  If, on the other hand, one views religion as a belief system that permeates 
all aspects of that individual’s persona, the totality of these traits becomes too interconnected to 
permit any one component to be unraveled from the others. The distinction between Sunday and 
the rest of the week is a false dichotomy because, 
[H]uman beings should worship God on Sundays or some other chosen day and 
go about their business without reference to God the rest of the time . . . [S]uch a 
result would be absurd.  Individuals of strong religious convictions do not live in 
a vacuum or practice their faith only on their days of worship.79  
 
Only a more fragmented understanding of the role of religion in one’s life permits a bifurcation 
of that person’s religious life as opposed to his commercial life. 
 Other scholars argue that the Court decisions favoring accommodation of a “corporate 
conscience” doctrine misunderstand the economic trade-off between wages and benefits.80 
Because the employee’s total compensation package includes both wages and benefits, the 
benefits component should not be treated differently from wages.  Both wages and benefits are 
earned by the employee and if the wage component does not constitute a burden to the employer, 
neither should the benefits component. In the United States, employer based healthcare coverage 
is traceable to an accident of history.   During World War II, when employers faced a federal 
freeze on wages, the War Labor Board permitted the exemption of benefits from the definition of 
wages.81  The employer’s role in financing health care became further entrenched as the tax code 
                                                
79 Ronald J. Colombo, The First Amendment and the Business Corporation, Oxford University Press (2015). 
80 Elizabeth Sepper, Contraception and the Birth of Corporate Conscience, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 
303, 319-20 (2014).  
81 See generally, PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (Basic Books 1982). 
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granted preferential advantages to both the employer and the employee.82  The employer’s 
contribution could be subject to a reduced payroll tax whereas the employee is free of income tax 
on benefits conferred, although he is obligated to pay income tax on wages.  If both wages and 
benefits combine to form the total compensation package, then the wage and benefits component 
each functions in an identical manner and it is therefore questionable why the benefits 
component should be delinked and become subject to a religious challenge. If the employer 
cannot raise free exercise concerns when his employee chooses to spend her earned wages on 
contraceptives, why then should the courts allow the employer to invoke that very argument 
when the employee is merely availing herself of federally granted benefits? 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
The ACA revolutionized the delivery of health care. As constituted by the ACA, the 
national health insurance system is financed through a combination of employer, employee, and 
public funding through government subsidies.  With the 2012 Supreme Court decision in 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,83 which held that the penalty provision 
for non-compliance is legally a tax, the federal government sought to impose a regulated, 
mandatory health insurance justified by a compelling government interest.  The ACA provisions 
should be seen as other federal insurance programs, such as workman’s compensation and social 
security insurance.84 With the Hobby Lobby decision, the Supreme Court has veered away from a 
line of cases that did not permit an accommodation for a free exercise claims in the instances of 
national mandatory regulation schemes enacted for the benefit of Americans and allowed, 
                                                
82 Id. 
83 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594. 
84 See generally United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); S. Ridge Baptist Church v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio, 911 
F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1990). 
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instead, a diminution of insurance benefits from those envisioned by Congress when it passed the 
contraceptive mandate into law. 
VII. PROPOSAL  
In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court allowed the owners of a family-owned, closely-held 
for-profit corporation to assert a claim of free exercise, which had the consequence of permitting 
these employers to interfere with their employees’ federally mandated rights.  It should be clear 
from the facts in both the Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood cases that a very small number of 
individuals – the employers  (in each case, five people) – have, legally, been granted the power 
to encumber access to insurance coverage for a much larger group of persons – the employees.  It 
has been estimated that in the United States, the closely-held corporation format of doing 
business constitutes about 90% of all corporations who employ approximately 62% of employees 
in the workforce.85  By accepting the premise that a closely-held corporation is controlled by a 
small group of owners or shareholders, the Supreme Court treated the owners of that closely-held 
corporation and the corporation as the identical entity or same person.  Through the conflation of 
the corporation with its owners, the corporation, as a legal entity, becomes compromised.  After 
all, the corporation qua legal person, was birthed into law precisely to separate out ownership 
from control of that entity.  The Supreme Court’s decision marks a radical departure from the 
long held judicial precedents, which separate the corporate entity from its shareholders.   
Furthermore, the majority’s application of the Dictionary Act definition encouraged a 
shift in the corporate law.  This, in turn, will only exacerbate and encourage the infusion of 
religious values and identities into what should be a neutral workspace.  It is proposed that the 
dissent’s restriction of the “person” to the human person would mitigate the problem of the 
                                                
85 The Economic Impact of Closely Held Businesses, Center for Closely Held Businesses, WILLIAM PATTERSON 
UNIVERSITY, www.wpunj.edu/CloselyHeld/EconomicImpact.dot (Oct. 28, 2015 at 2:15PM)  
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expression of religious values into the public workspace and its concomitant problem of 
encumbering access to legislatively granted rights.  The specter of what Justice Ginsburg, in her 
dissent, anticipated as a proliferation of RFRA claims is based on the majority’s determination 
that “RFRA extends to for-profit corporations” and is, therefore, bound to “have untoward 
effects.”86  Such an expansive interpretation of RFRA in its application to corporate personhood, 
states Justice Ginsburg “invites for-profit entities to seek religion based exemptions from 
regulation they deem offensive to their faith.”87  In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg underscores that 
RFRA’s requirements  
[M]ust take adequate account of the burdens of a requested accommodation may 
impose on nonbeneficiaries.  No tradition, and no prior decision under RFRA, 
allows a religion-based exemption when the accommodation would be harmful to 
others – here, the very persons the contraceptive coverage requirement was 
designed to protect.88 
 
To mitigate the real possibility that the majority, the employees, not be held hostage to the faith 
of the minority, the employer, and from being prevented to easily access federally mandated 
benefits, I propose the adoption of either of the following solutions. In so far as the corporate 
form is a creation of the Legislature, that legislative body can amend its definition of personhood 
to expressly restrict, for certain purposes, its definition to the human or natural person and or the 
not-for-profit corporation.  In fact, two states, Louisiana and Pennsylvania, have already done 
so.89  An alternative approach might reconsider the current understanding of the closely held 
corporation.90  I submit that the focus on ownership and control of the closely-held corporation, 
                                                
86 Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)(internal citations omitted). 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 2801. 
89 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:5234 (2015) Courts and Judicial Procedure, and Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2403 (2014) Religious 
Freedom Protection Act.  
90 A closely held corporation, as defined by the Internal Revenue Code, is a corporation where up to five 
shareholders own more than fifty percent of the outstanding stock. See 26 U.S.C. § 542(a)(2) (2015). See also 
Publication 542: Corporations, Dep’t. of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service (IRS) (Rev. March 26, 2012) 
available at, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p542.pdf. 
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should be redirected to an inquiry that instead considers the size of the corporation, the aggregate 
value of that company’s assets, and the impact of that corporation in its industry. Hobby Lobby, 
after all, had over 60,000 employees across forty-five states.  There, a minority of five 
individuals controlled the healthcare insurance fate and effectively blocked easy access to 
federally mandated contraceptive benefits of thousands of employees, most of whom did not 
share their employer’s religious faith.  To focus instead on the corporation’s size, assets, and 
place in the industry would subvert the oppression of the majority (employees) by the minority 
(employers).  To reframe the nature of the inquiry will also result in a closer adherence to the 
Congressional intent in the passage of the ACA as well as greater fairness and balance in the 
workplace. 
